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DO JUDGES KNOW BEST? 
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY 
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER. By Ilya 
Somin.1 Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. 2016 
(Second Edition). Pp. xiv + 291. $27.95 (cloth). 
James Allan2 
Labels are notoriously slippery tools. Just think of the debate 
between “natural law adherents” and “legal positivists” on the 
nature of law. Whether the holders of these two views are in fact 
disagreeing at all depends on what you take to be the content 
behind the respective labels.3 Or take the two camps of legal 
positivism, the “internal legal positivists” and the “external legal 
positivists.” Are they in fact disagreeing about whether, at least 
sometimes, moral norms can be among the legal determinants of 
the law (so not just social facts determine the law in all legal 
systems ever to have existed), or is this debate merely one of 
terminology and of no real significance?4 Again, your answer may 
be influenced by what you take to fall within the aegis of these 
two accounts of the nature of law. The point is that we humans 
cannot think at all without labels, but at times we cannot think 
well with them. 
And that brings me to those of us who think comparatively 
smaller government tends to produce better human welfare 
outcomes than bigger government; who favor giving individual 
humans plenty of scope to make calls for themselves (when it 
comes to what they can say and much else); and who think the 
 
 1. Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
 2. Garrick Professor of Law, T.C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland. 
 3. For example, Larry Alexander says this: “On this account, positivists and natural 
lawyers are not disagreeing, for they are each discussing the nature of a different thing. 
The positivists are discussing law, the natural lawyers, LAW [i.e. non-degraded, true law]. 
Neither need deny the others’ claims.” Larry Alexander, Was Dworkin an Originalist?, in 
THE LEGACY OF RONALD DWORKIN 299, 307 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 
Oxford, 2016). 
 4. See James Allan, A Modest Proposal, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197 (2003). 
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private sector usually out-produces the public sector. That 
package of views would describe me. Yet I would not describe 
myself as a “libertarian.” Too many self-described libertarians 
seem to me to hold core-level views that are grounded in natural 
rights thinking where I am at core a consequentialist. Likewise, a 
good many libertarians leave me uncertain that they would be 
prepared to make anything like the compromises I would make as 
regards national security and national sovereignty and just 
generally Hobbesian “we live in a dangerous world” concerns. 
Thirdly, and no less importantly, most libertarians do not seem to 
share my views about democracy, by which I mean majoritarian 
“let the numbers count” democracy.5 I see it as the least-bad 
decision-making option available, and certainly a good deal better 
than the sort of strong judicial review that exists in my native 
Canada or in the United States, where nearly all (Canada) or 
probably most (the United States) top judges adopt some version 
of a “living tree”6 or “living Constitution” interpretive approach, 
under which these same unelected judges end up deciding a whole 
host of social policy issues.7 
So I am inclined to shun the label “libertarian.” My guess is 
that the author of this fine book, Democracy and Political 
Ignorance, would welcome it. Yet, as regards the first-order 
substantive issues related to one’s ideal size of government or the 
desirable scope individuals ought to be left with to shape their 
own lives, Professor Somin and I seem to be broadly in agreement. 
However, on the question of democracy, and when the majority 
 
 5. See JAMES ALLAN, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: STEPS IN THE WRONG 
DIRECTION (2014). 
 6. This phrase was made famous, in the Westminster common law world, by Lord 
Sankey in the Privy Council case from Canada of Edwards v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1930] 
A.C. 124 (Can. P.C.). This “living tree” term is the broad equivalent outside the United 
States for what Americans describe as a “living Constitution” approach. 
 7. The list of such issues in the United States will be well known to readers. In 
Canada the list includes same-sex marriage (Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2003] O.J. 
No. 2268 (Can. Ont. C.A.); euthanasia (Carter v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2015] S.C.C. 5); 
the scope of free speech (in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 
199 (Can.), it was held that restrictions on tobacco advertising were inconsistent with the 
freedom of expression, but this was overruled in Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. JTI-Macdonald 
Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 (Can.)); the treatment of those claiming to be refugees (Singh 
v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t and Immigr.), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (Can.)); whether prisoners 
can vote (Sauv. . . v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 
(Can.), overruling Sauv. . . v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2000] 2 F.C. 117 (Can. 
C.A.)); whether Parliament can prevent inroads into the scope of the one-size-fits-all 
nationalised health system (Chaoulli v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), 2005 S.C.C. 35, [2005] 1 
S.C.R. 791 (Can.)); and so on. 
ALLAN_DRAFT 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/17 7:04 AM 
2017] BOOK REVIEWS 481 
 
ought to prevail, we clearly are not. That said, and I will return to 
say more below, this is a book well worth reading. It is an updated 
second edition packed with interesting details, with the careful 
elucidation of arguments and counter-arguments, with the telling 
aperçu, and all in the service of the book’s main theme, that voters 
are on the whole pretty ignorant, and, more to the point, that this 
ignorance is probably rational from their point of view. Nor is this 
thesis put forward in the service of arguing for ways to make 
voters better informed about political matters. Somin tells us at 
the end of chapter seven, the final chapter before his conclusion, 
that “the painful reality is that we cannot count on any major 
increase in political knowledge in the foreseeable future” (p. 223). 
No, this thesis about voter ignorance is basically part and parcel 
of a larger critique of majoritarianism. Think of it as the plaintiff’s 
brief for judicially enforced constitutional rights of a broadly 
Richard Epsteinian sort. 
Now I reject that desired end point or core position for 
reasons I will sketch out in a moment. Nevertheless, I am very 
glad that I read this book. It was stimulating. It was well-written. 
It did all the John Stuart Mill things about making one think again, 
and questioning one’s own positions, that you would like a book 
to do. If you have an interest in constitutional law, and whether 
you classify yourself as a libertarian, a majoritarian, or something 
else again, put this book on your list to order. 
In the rest of this article I will do two things. Firstly, I will 
give an overview of Somin’s book. Then, secondly, I will say why 
I did not find its rejection of majoritarianism to be convincing. As 
for the overview, this is a seven-chapter book with an introduction 
and conclusion. The first chapter runs through a host of data, at 
times depressing, indicating the levels of political ignorance. Put 
more bluntly, Somin tells you just how little the preponderance of 
voters actually knows about issues and, well, facts. The second 
chapter considers whether, nevertheless, they know enough basic 
facts to pass the implicit hurdles of various theories of 
representative democracy. Somin concludes that the answer is 
“no.” “Public knowledge levels fall well short of the requirements 
of normative theories of political participation” (p. 73). Then the 
author moves to arguing that this political ignorance is 
“rational”—not a sign of stupidity, but of rationality. “Political 
ignorance is rational because an individual voter has virtually no 
chance of influencing the outcome of an election—possibly less 
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than one in one hundred million in the case of a modern U.S. 
presidential election” (p. 75). Somin says this point applies as 
much to “highly altruistic and civic-minded citizens as to narrowly 
self-interested ones” (p. 78). There is a caveat however. “[I]t turns 
out that the decision to vote is rational so long as the voter 
perceives a significant difference between candidates and cares 
even slightly about the welfare of fellow citizens, as well as his or 
her own” (p. 80). Refinements on this get considered, such as 
possibly caring about the size of a mandate, and how “some other 
reason not clearly related to voting” (p. 97) will, in Somin’s view, 
be the most powerful determinant of one’s political knowledge. 
That is the first half of the book, more or less, in which the 
author analyzes the nature and extent of the problem of political 
ignorance in a democracy like the United States. Lots of data; lots 
of social science; lots of asserted ignorance, albeit of a sort claimed 
also to be rational. Then the last four chapters shift to considering 
what Somin considers to be potential solutions. As noted above, 
Somin is pessimistic about voters becoming better informed any 
time soon. That is chapter seven, the last one. Nor does Somin 
think that various “shortcut” aids that might guide voters are 
sufficient to overcome his earlier critiques. Yes, there is 
“considerable merit” to the argument that “voters can infer 
candidates’ policy stances from their partisan affiliations rather 
than undertaking the much more difficult task of inquiring into 
the views of each individual aspirant to office” (p. 109). But there 
is not enough merit to this claim, says Somin. Nor is there enough 
from the idea that voters might follow the lead of “opinion 
leaders” (p. 115), or that voting based on past performance, 
“retrospective voting” (p. 117), might on balance do the trick. 
That is chapter four, which even looks at the Condorcet jury 
theorem (p. 133). 
That leaves just chapters five and six. The former is about 
what Somin calls “foot voting,” or moving to jurisdictions with 
policies more palatable to the individual. In the United States that 
means moving between the various 50 States. This ties in to 
federalism and the decentralization of decision-making. Somin is 
a fan of this foot voting, despite recognising and detailing the 
admitted costs. With foot voting, the incentives, he says, are better 
than when it comes to ballot-box voting. Accordingly, for the 
author (and when it comes to seeing the upsides of foot voting I 
am more than a little sympathetic, and certainly agree with the 
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author’s support of federalism), this counts as a real solution to 
the problem of political ignorance. The other claimed solution to 
the problem laid out in chapter six, an even more crucial solution 
for Somin on my reading of the book, is strong judicial review—
unelected judges being given the power to invalidate or strike 
down the elected legislature’s laws on the basis of their 
interpretation of a written constitution.8 It is here where I strongly 
differ with the author and here that I will focus in what remains 
of this review. He rejects majoritarianism. I think it is the least-
bad option going. Even more to the point, I think majoritarianism 
is the only option that has any chance at all of delivering anything 
like the first-order substantive policy positions Somin favors. 
Why? Start by remembering that Somin’s critique of 
majoritarianism is not intended as some sort of brief for Euro-
leftism or for the democracy-enervating—I would say democracy-
emasculating—arrangements of the European Union. No, it is 
meant as a brief for judicially enforced constitutional rights that 
will deliver broadly libertarian outcomes. And yet Somin’s dislike 
or distrust of majoritarianism is certainly extremely reminiscent 
of the attitudes of, say, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the 
European Commission, who talks as though there are a good 
number of things more important than letting-the-numbers-count 
democracy.9 Not terribly dissimilarly, Somin’s tone is of the 
“democracy is okay within limits, old chap, but let’s keep a firm 
lid on things” variety. Here is how the author puts it: 
Unlike Plato and the totalitarians, I do not argue for a complete 
rejection of democracy. I accept the evidence that democracy 
generally functions better than alternative systems of 
government… [including because democracies are] more likely 
to avoid major policy disasters and do not commit mass murder 
 
 8. Such is the relatively recent growth in the extent to which common law judges 
around the English-speaking world are prepared to second-guess and gainsay elected 
legislatures that one could argue that this is happening even in jurisdictions without a 
written constitution, meaning in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. I make just such 
an argument myself. See James Allan, Statutory Bills of Rights: You Read Words In, You 
Read Words Out, You Take Parliament’s Clear Intention and You Shake It All About – 
Doin’ the Sankey Hanky Panky, in THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
SCEPTICAL ESSAYS 108 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2011). 
 9. “Monetary policy is a serious issue. We should discuss this in secret, in the 
Eurogroup […] I’m ready to be insulted as being insufficiently democratic, but I want to 
be serious […] I am for secret, dark debates.” Jean-Claude Juncker, quoted in Valentina 
Pop, Eurogroup Chief: I’m for secret, dark debates, EUOBSERVER (Apr. 21, 2011, 10:01 
AM), https://euobserver.com/economic/32222. 
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against their own people…. But the superiority of democracy 
over other forms of government leaves open the possibility that 
democracy might function better if its powers were more 
tightly limited” (p. 9, internal footnotes omitted and emphasis 
mine). 
“Phew,” was my first reaction on reading that it was not to be a 
complete rejection. 
More seriously, Somin builds up a case that focuses on facts. 
“Throughout this book, I focus primarily on political knowledge 
defined as awareness of factual matters related to politics and 
public policy” (p. 9). The explicit thesis he lays out is that the 
voters simply do not have enough knowledge of those facts. Of 
course, that alone is not enough to defeat my sort of “democracy 
is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that 
have been tried from time to time”10 Churchillian defense of 
majoritarian democracy. Hence Somin also relies, implicitly, on 
an unspoken premise that some sort of caste of experts—be they 
unelected judges or bureaucrats or something else again—that 
does have this knowledge of facts, and (to make the argument 
work properly) has it to a noticeably higher degree than do the 
voters, will tend to make better decisions, all things considered 
(including taking account of the costs of this sort of paternalism, 
whose costs Somin ignores). I will be blunt here and say straight 
out that I am skeptical as regards this Sominian unspoken premise 
or faith in a caste of experts. I doubt very much that such experts 
would outperform majoritarian democracy—which I stress again 
is a comparative claim on my part, not a rose-tinted brief for 
majoritarianism as some sort of unsullied good. 
Take the euro currency in the European Union. A more top-
down, expert-imposed policy decision is hard to imagine. It is 
overwhelmingly likely that the German voting population would 
have rejected it out of hand, if ever they had been given the 
opportunity to have a say. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems 
pretty clear that it was a mistake for some countries to enter into 
this new supranational currency, and in the long term that 
probably includes Germany. The fact-filled experts misfired. 
Likewise with immigration in Europe, at least if you believe that 
Angela Merkel’s recent unilateral decision to welcome a million 
people claiming to be refugees counts as a decision that was taken 
 
 10. 444 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1947) col. 203 (UK). 
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outside of majoritarian constraints—which looks very plausible in 
the light of the results for her political party since she announced 
that decision. 
Other examples are hardly difficult to list. The EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy is another expert-driven policy. Its 
long-term effects may be amongst some of the most insidious and 
malign going for whole swathes of the Third World. Or take any 
of the various United Nations bodies. When the United Kingdom 
attempted to reform its welfare laws to link government housing 
supply more directly to the number of inhabitants via a “bedroom 
tax,” which was a much less sweeping welfare reform than what 
Bill Clinton signed into law in the United States, the UN’s Special 
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Raquel Rolnik—who surely 
must qualify on the face of things as an “expert”—called for the 
immediate suspension of this so-called bedroom tax.11 Or, again, 
there is the UN Panel that found in favor of the claim made by 
Julian Assange, of WikiLeaks notoriety, that he has been 
subjected to “arbitrary detention.” This Panel, by a 3-1 count, 
recommended Mr. Assange’s immediate release and (for good 
measure) some monetary compensation.12 Again still, at least if 
one is inclined to count the United Nations Human Rights 
Council as possessing expertise when it comes to human rights, 
then there is the fact that it—together with the United Nations 
General Assembly—has issued more resolutions alleging rights-
infringing conduct against Israel than against all other countries 
on Earth, combined! And note that all of the examples in this 
paragraph are happily free of the taint of majoritarian decision-
making. 
 
 11. U.N. Rep. of the Hum. Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on 
the Right to Non-Discrimination in this Context, Dec. 30, 2013, U.N. Doc A/HRC/
25/54/Add.2 (2013), available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13
/191/93/PDF/G1319193.pdf?OpenElement. See too the Special Rapporteur’s interview in 
The Guardian newspaper, Amelia Gentleman, ‘Shocking’ Bedroom Tax Should Be Axed, 
Says UN Investigator, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 10, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/
society/2013/sep/11/bedroom-tax-should-be-axed-says-un-investigator. 
 12. This conclusion seems patently absurd to me. But there is no denying that the 
people who made it would be classed as “experts.” See U.N. Rep. of the Hum. Rights 
Council, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its Seventy-
Fourth Session, 30 November–4 December 2015, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2015 (2016). 
For what it is worth, the former director of public prosecutions in England, Ken Macdonald 
QC, characterised the reasoning of these “experts” as “beyond parody.” I’m inclined to 
think Mr. Macdonald was being too kind. 
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However, and despite the fact I could go on and on in these 
types of realms with similar examples of supposed “experts” with 
great knowledge reaching extremely suboptimal results, perhaps 
all this is unfair to Somin. There is nothing in the book that 
indicates he has any fondness for the supposed expertise flowing 
from European Union officials or commissioners, or from any 
United Nations body. So let us take an example of the results of 
claimed expertise somewhat closer to home. Universities are 
packed full of smart people who have as much knowledge of facts 
as any people alive. How do such experts do when it comes to 
running universities themselves? Not well, by my way of 
thinking.13 In fact I lean towards agreeing with William Buckley’s 
famous line that he would rather entrust the government of the 
United States to the first 400 names in the Boston phone book 
than to the faculty of Harvard University. Still unfair to Somin? 
Okay, so forget that too. How about the many experts who have 
designed and implemented the Affordable Care Act, admittedly 
a change passed by the elected legislature? Are these the sort of 
experts Somin has in mind as non-ignorant decision-makers, 
people he believes will deliver the sort of small government and 
free market outcomes he wants? 
I suppose what I would have liked to have read in this book 
is why Somin believes that in the long-term experts (however he 
would end up defining that term) will have a better hit rate than 
voters in delivering the sort of first-order substantive outcomes he 
wants. Put differently, if you are going to pour the cynical acid of 
public-choice-type theory on voters, why not pour it on “experts” 
and on unelected judges too? 
And that takes me to chapter six of the book, the one in 
which Somin makes his positive case for strong judicial review. 
After all, perhaps the only experts Somin really has any faith in at 
all to oversee, guide and gainsay the voters are the top judges in a 
common law jurisdiction, or, more narrowly still, maybe it is just 
the top judges in the United States. If so, it is here that he and I 
really part company. In effect, Somin rejects or significantly 
downplays (depending on your reading) the so-called 
countermajoritarian difficulty. He does not fully endorse what he 
calls “the radical interpretation of the impact of voter ignorance” 
 
 13. In the Australian context, see James Allan, Why Australian Universities Are Not 
Good Enough, QUADRANT, Mar. 2014, at 81. 
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(p. 185), which asserts that voter ignorance means that no 
legislation truly reflects the will of the majority, so that while 
judges cannot “simply overturn legislation anytime they wish … 
they should not refuse to overturn it for fear of acting in a 
countermajoritarian fashion” (p. 186). 
Instead, after noting that he believes “the radical view has 
some merit” (p. 186), Somin concedes that some legislation does 
in fact reflect majority will and where that is not clear there is still 
the chance it has “penetrated the barriers of political ignorance 
despite the odds against such an occurrence” (p. 186). So the 
author prefers a less radical, more moderate approach under 
which “the problem of political ignorance does not completely 
eliminate the countermajoritarian difficulty but does greatly 
reduce its significance” (p. 187). Basically this “moderate” 
approach boils down to asserting that “[s]ince most legislation has 
only limited majoritarian significance, if any, countermajoritarian 
concerns should be far more easily outweighed by other 
considerations than earlier theories suggest” (p. 188). What 
counts as falling within the ambit of “those other considerations” 
Somin does not tell us. Such a “complete theory of the range of 
values that should influence constitutional decision-making by the 
judiciary is outside the scope of this chapter” (p. 188), according 
to the author. 
Put differently, Somin thinks that worries about the 
countermajoritarian difficulty—in my terms, the worry or 
difficulty that you will not achieve good long-term outcomes when 
a handful of unelected ex-lawyer judges are deciding a host of 
social policy issues over the heads of 300 million plus citizens, and 
doing so by themselves (as Jeremy Waldron14 has shown), 
employing the strictly majoritarian procedure of 5 beats 4 
counting of judicial votes—amount to very little indeed. For him, 
it is “the ‘correct’ theory of constitutional law” (p. 188) that 
overwhelmingly matters with majoritarian concerns being 
tangential, at best. Heck, Somin goes so far as to say (though, 
truth be told, I found this point hard to follow, if not smacking of 
Alice in Wonderland) that strong “judicial review sometimes 
actually increases the majoritarianism of the political system by 
reducing the anti-majoritarian impact of voter ignorance” (p. 189, 
 
 14. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts, 
123 YALE L.J. 1626 (2014). 
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emphasis in the original). I think Somin’s claim here is that 
unelected judges can help keep the size of government more 
limited, and indeed limit what government does more generally 
(p. 190), though why we should pre-suppose that a majority of 
voters in some actual jurisdiction will or ought always to prefer 
that is beyond me. Likewise, whether today’s top common law 
judges are a force for smaller government and less bureaucratic 
activity is clearly an empirical issue—a question of fact as Somin 
would put it—and personally I am very skeptical on that front too. 
Indeed, Somin hedges his bets by later saying that this supposed 
representation-reinforcing effect “applies only to judicial actions 
that limit the powers of other branches of government over the 
private sector,” not to “[j]udicial decisions that replace the power 
of other branches with judicial control” (p. 191). But that seems 
like cherry-picking to me, as there will always be a few cases from 
a top court to fit just about any theory or worldview. 
At any rate, I hope that suffices to give a sense of where 
Somin attempts to take the reader. Remembering that my support 
for majoritarianism is of the “least-bad option available” variety, 
I will finish this article by raising what I think are two significant 
problems for the author’s distrust of, dislike for, and 
disappointment with majoritarian democracy vis-à-vis strong 
judicial review. 
Firstly, I think there is more to the fact/value dichotomy than 
Somin appears to think. Somin tells the reader right at the start 
that he will focus on “awareness of factual matters related to 
politics and public policy” (p. 9); that “[d]isagreement over some 
issues, such as abortion, may largely be determined by conflicting 
fundamental values, with little role for factual information” (p. 11, 
internal footnote omitted); but that on “a vast range of major 
political issues … differences … turn primarily on disagreements 
over how to achieve widely agreed-upon goals, such as economic 
prosperity, crime reduction, environmental protection [and 
more]” (p. 11). So the picture he paints is one where social policy 
choices (outside of, perhaps, one’s preferred abortion regime) 
would become largely self-evident provided all of the disputants 
knew (or agreed on) all of the facts. 
Yet I doubt that very much. From way back in my doctorate 
days onwards I have been in David Hume’s philosophical camp, 
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and certainly preferred him to Immanuel Kant.15 I think Hume is 
correct that reason is inert and that it is the sentiments that move 
action, so the Humean conception of reason strikes me as more 
plausible than the Kantian one; I think Hume’s right too about 
the naturalistic fallacy—his point that there is an error involved in 
attempts to derive an “ought” from an “is” (though, as with 
Utilitarians, you can dissolve away all “oughts” and make them 
functions of the “is,” of what happens to make the greatest 
number of humans happy, and doing that will not breach Hume’s 
Law); and I think Hume’s position against moral realism and in 
favor of moral scepticism or non-cognitivism—that moral 
evaluations do not possess a mind-independent status—is also 
correct. Put differently, and leaving aside the philosophy, it is not 
just facts about the external, causal world that determine people’s 
preferred social policy positions. We all bring different sentiments 
and preferences to the table. So we can know (or agree) all the 
costs of climate change and of a carbon tax and yet some will want 
to forego “5 units” of current consumption, some “20 units,” and 
some will want to put money into coping with a changed world 
rather than foregoing any current consumption by cutting 
emissions. Or take the purely economic realm. Is it irrational or 
against reason to prefer to reduce relative inequality, even if (let 
us assume) such inequality-reducing-steps would lower a society’s 
overall wealth levels, and indeed would even make the bottom 
quintile of the population poorer? I don’t think so. Some people 
might simply prefer or value more relative equality to preferring 
more overall wealth in society, or even to preferring more 
absolute wealth for the bottom quintile than what they would 
have if inequality were not being reduced. Now that favoring of 
more equality over more absolute wealth (or more absolute 
wealth for those at the bottom) would not be my preference, nor 
would it be Somin’s. But neither is the holding of that preference 
irrational, at least not on the Humean understanding of reason. 
Somin seems to me to skate over these deep philosophical 
matters and just assume that most of the time “the facts” will do 
the work (or enough of the work) needed to resolve disagreement 
so that all that stands in the way of knowing what to do is political 
ignorance. Hence, for Somin, we just need to inject a bit of 
 
 15. See JAMES ALLAN, A SCEPTICAL THEORY OF MORALITY AND LAW (1998). Or 
better yet, see J. L. MACKIE, HUME’S MORAL THEORY (rev. ed. 1980) and J. L. MACKIE, 
ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1991). 
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aristocracy (of the modern judicial variety rather than the older 
land-holding sort) into the political system and by doing that we 
will outperform the calls that would be made under a majoritarian 
set-up driven by the voters, such as you see most clearly in New 
Zealand (which, by the way, ranks higher in terms of economic 
freedom than does the United States, with its strong judicial 
review16), or the United Kingdom before it entered the European 
Union. Of course if, say, a lawyerly caste from which the top 
judges are chosen tends, on average, to hold different political and 
social druthers than the majority of voters, then on my premises 
factual knowledge (or voters’ ignorance of facts) would not be the 
only variable. The values being brought to the table by the 
ultimate decision-makers would matter too. Relatedly, if you 
frame issues and goals in vague and amorphous enough terms 
(“crime reduction,” “environmental protection,” “security 
against the threat of attack” (p. 11)), then you can follow Somin 
and assert that “differences … turn primarily on disagreements 
over how to achieve widely agreed-upon goals” (p. 11). However, 
that seems to me to be because you have finessed disagreement 
by moving your focus up to the Olympian heights of “widely 
agreed-upon-goals.” Make things sufficiently general, sweeping 
and generic and of course you are far more likely to find 
overwhelmingly shared human sentiments that then only require 
knowledge of likely facts to point you towards what to do. But 
descend down from those heights towards the quagmire of day-
to-day detail and all those shared sentiments across the 
population start to dissipate. And then “knowing the facts” is not 
enough to make the decisions with the best long-term 
consequences. You need also to know what people’s differing 
sentiments or preferences or values are, and no one knows those 
better than you do, the voter, and certainly not a committee of 
unelected ex-lawyers. Or so it seems to me, which is why on 
reading this book I was not convinced by the author’s division of 
labor between facts and values. 
 
 16. In fact, in the 2016 rankings New Zealand ranked 3rd, the United Kingdom 
(another jurisdiction without strong judicial review as it too lacks a written constitution) 
and Australia (which has a very American-style Madisonian written constitution but of the 
initial Madisonian sort, without any bill of rights, and so the strong judicial review is 
overwhelmingly restricted to federalism issues) both tied for 10th place in the rankings, and 
the United States was in the 16th spot. See FRASER INST., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE 
WORLD: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2016). 
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I mentioned above that I thought there were two significant 
problems with the book’s attack on majoritarianism and support 
for judicially enforced constitutional rights of a broadly Richard 
Epsteinian sort. The second problem I note now is not 
philosophical at all, but rather wholly empirical. Put bluntly, I do 
not see why someone with Somin’s (and, broadly, my) substantive 
preferences for small government outcomes thinks today’s top 
judges are likely to deliver them. Sure, I can well understand why 
someone with broadly big government, left-leaning first-order 
druthers might think that today’s top judges are more likely to 
satisfy his or her preferences than are the majority of voters 
through the institutions of elected representative government. 
What I am not sure about is why a libertarian-leaning small-
government man thinks his best bet is the judges. Now I concede 
that perhaps my scepticism here has to do with the fact that I am 
not American. I know what the judges are doing in Canada and in 
the United Kingdom and in Australia and New Zealand. Give me 
the elected politicians any day, and not because they have a 
sterling track record but because—all things considered—they 
seem to me to have a better track record. Or rather, given my 
Hobbesian small government views and sentiments the elected 
legislature tends to do better. 
Maybe, though, things are different in the U.S. Yet from my 
outsider’s vantage it just does not appear that way. There are few 
Scalia-like originalists to be found amongst the upper echelons of 
the American judiciary. Even a Republican appointee to the 
Supreme Court votes to uphold the Affordable Care Act, and 
does so in the face of an attack founded in federalist constitutional 
considerations (of the sort Somin extols). Where, I wonder, are 
“the facts” that support the view that in the United States strong 
judicial review will deliver the sort of first-order substantive 
outcomes Somin wants to see prevail? I would have liked to see 
the book try to make that case more directly, that the gainsaying 
and overseeing judges now in office have the remotest likelihood 
in the near- to medium-term future—using the machinery of 
strong judicial review based on interpreting the United States 
Constitution (and, to be clear, I mean the sort of “living 
Constitution,” non-originalist sort of approaches to constitutional 
interpretation that seem to me presently to be ascendant)—of 
enforcing constitutional outcomes of a broadly libertarian nature. 
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CONCLUSION 
Let me say it again: This is a thought-provoking book that 
repays the time spent reading it. Yes, ultimately, its main thesis 
left me unconvinced. I think that majoritarian democracy, which 
includes a Popperian capacity to “throw the bums out” that is 
lacking in all aristocratic or expert-driven decision-making set-
ups, for all its flaws and all the political ignorance of the voters 
who are given such a big role, nevertheless still offers the least-
bad way to govern tens and hundreds of millions of people. Ilya 
Somin thinks otherwise. After you have read his book you will be 
better placed to decide for yourself. 
 
